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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
A.

The District Court Erred in Concluding that Mr. Jimenez Did Not File His
Successive Petition Within a Reasonable Time
1.

The "reasonable time" to bring a successive petition does not begin until the
underlying proceedings are concluded

The district court found each of Mr. Jimenez's claims untimely by analyzing the time that
had passed since he had "notice" of the factual basis of his claim. For example, with respect to
Mr. Jimenez's claim concerning the DNA evidence, the district court analyzed whether the
successive claim was filed within a reasonable time from the district court's denial of the motion
for DNA testing on September 19, 2011.
However, to determine whether a petitioner filed a successive petition within a reasonable
time from receiving notice of the factual basis for the claim, courts must also necessarily consider
the status of related litigation. Here, Mr. Jimenez filed his successive petition while the appeal
concerning the initial petition was (and is) still pending and the district court's conclusion that
his successive petition was untimely is erroneous.
Citing to Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 904, 174 P.3d 870, 874 (2007), the state
claims Mr. Jimenez's argument that the status ofrelated proceedings is relevant to the timeliness
issue is frivolous because there is no fixed limitation period for bringing a successive petition
and successive petitions must be filed within a reasonable time after claims are discovered.
Respondent's Brief, p. 11. The state is incorrect.
a.

The time-limits and special procedures applicable in death penalty cases
do not serve as the yardstick to determine a reasonable time to file a
successive petition in non capital cases

In Charboneau, the Court held that "in determining what a reasonable time is for filing a

1

successive petition [under LC. § 19-4908], we will simply consider it on a case-by-case basis, as
has been done in capital cases." Charboneau, 144 Idaho at 905, 174 P.3d at 875. The Court
further indicated that timeliness is measured from the date of notice, not from the date a
petitioner assembles a complete cache of evidence. Id. By holding that the timeliness of non
death penalty successive petitions is determined on a case-by-case basis, the Court did not
incorporate the time-limits and special procedures applicable in death penalty cases as the
yardstick to determine a reasonable time in non capital cases. Indeed, such a conclusion would
not only be inconsistent with the direction to analyze reasonableness on the unique facts of each
case but also work surprise and injustice.
Death penalty cases are governed by "special appellate and post-conviction" procedures
set forth in Idaho Code§ 19-2719 to eliminate "unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death
sentence." Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 57, 106 P.3d 376, 383 (2004). In a capital case, a
claimant for post-conviction relief has a sole opportunity to raise all challenges to the conviction
and sentence, which must be raised in one post-conviction application within 42 days of the
filing of the judgment imposing the death penalty. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 57, 106 P.3d
376, 383 (2004). Ineffective assistance of counsel is a claim that should be reasonably known
immediately upon the completion of the trial and can be raised in a post-conviction proceeding.

State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 807, 820 P.2d 665, 677 (1991).
The harsh effect of the expedited and unified procedures mandated in death penalty cases
is ameliorated by the automatic appointment of independent counsel to assist the petitioner with
his post-conviction remedies. See ICR 44.2. The district judge who sentenced the defendant [to
death] shall appoint at least one attorney to represent the defendant for the purpose of seeking
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any post-conviction remedy referred to in I.C. Section 19-2719(4). ICR 44.2. The attorney

appointed must "be someone other than counsel who represented the defendant prior to the
imposition of the death penalty" who "shall not be considered to be co-counsel with any other
attorney who represents the defendant, but may also be appointed to pursue the direct appeal for
the defendant." Id. Thus, a death penalty petitioner has the assistance of independent counsel
immediately following the conviction to assist in identifying and presenting ineffective assistance
of counsel claims in addition to direct appeal. It also appears that a death penalty applicant can
seek the appointment of counsel following discovery of the basis for a successive petition.
Unlike the death penalty applicant, petitioners seeking relief under Title 49 must first
identify claims and then prepare and file the initial and any successive petitions without the
assistance oflegal counsel. Accordingly, what is reasonable for the petitioner in a non capital
case is entirely distinct from what is reasonable for the death penalty petitioner or a petitioner
whose death penalty was converted to a sentence of life following post-conviction proceedings
under I.C. § 19-2719.
b.

It is not unreasonable to wait until underlying proceedings are complete to
initiate a successive action

As argued in Mr. Jimenez's opening brief, requiring concurrent proceedings would lead
to unnecessary litigation in situations where the petitioner secures relief on appeal and, as
illustrated by the district court's reasoning with respect to Mr. Jimenez's DNA claim, requiring
concurrent litigation on related issues could lead to confusion and inconsistent results.
Additionally, a petitioner would have no way of knowing he is expected to initiate a successive
proceeding while the initial proceedings remain pending. Outside the unique context of the
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unified procedures in death penalty cases, the time to collaterally attack a prior proceeding begins
to run when that prior action becomes final. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)(A) (time period for state
prisoners to file petition for federal habeas corpus relief begins to run on "the date on which the
judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for
seeking such review"); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (the time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent
judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this
subsection); LC. § 19-4902 (post-conviction relief proceeding may be initiated at any time within
one year "from the expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of an appeal or
from the determination of a proceeding following an appeal, whichever is later).
A petitioner in Mr. Jimenez's position would reasonably expect that the time to raise any
successive claims would not begin to run until following conclusion of the initial proceedings,
just as his time to file post-conviction did not begin until the direct appeal was final and as the
time to initiate any federal habeas proceedings is tolled until state post-conviction proceedings
are final. The interpretation proffered by the state, which begins the time to initiate a successive
post-conviction proceeding in non capital cases following the trial's conclusion without
consideration of the pendency of related proceedings, creates confusion and injustice.
For instance, the state claims that Mr. Jimenez "knew" the factual basis for his claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to secure DNA testing of the blood on the shoes immediately
following trial and, therefore, his successive petition was not filed within a reasonable time.
Under this reasoning, Mr. Jimenez's claim would have been untimely long before the time to
actually initiate post-conviction procedures even began. Nor is the state's exclusive focus on the
4

discovering the factual basis for the claim helpful in a case such as this one that involves a claim
raised in a successive petition that was "inadequately raised in the" in the initial proceedings for
sufficient reason, rather than a newly discovered claim that was not raised at all during the initial
proceedings.
Accordingly, whether related proceedings remain pending must necessarily be considered
in determining the reasonable time to initiate a successive petition for post-conviction relief
under J.C. § 19-4908. Because Mr. Jimenez filed the instant successive petition while the
proceedings from the initial petition remain pending, he necessarily filed it within a reasonable
time.
2.

Mr. Jimenez filed his successive petition within a reasonable time

The district court found that Mr. Jimenez had "notice" that his claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel for failing to secure DNA evidence was inadequately presented the date the
district court denied the motion for testing on September 19, 2011, and thus, analyzed whether
the successive claim was filed within a reasonable time from that date. CR 177. However, the
only "notice" provided on that date was that the motion was denied. Mr. Jimenez was not
transported to the hearing and did not have access to the district court's reasoning until the
transcript was prepared for this appeal. Further, Mr. Jimenez did not know that district court
would deny his petition because "DNA testing has not been performed" and it was "therefore,
impossible to determine what impact DNA testing would have had on the verdict" after the
district court dismissed his initial petition on May 18, 2012. See Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and Order, p. 10. Mr. Jimenez has argued that the district court's decision to deny DNA
testing was erroneous and that issue remains pending.

5

The record reveals that the lab report, which Mr. Jimenez attached to his petition was
issued on February 1, 2013. 1 CR 106-08. While reasonableness is not measured from the date a
complete "cache of evidence" is obtained, those DNA results were instrumental to establish that
his ineffective assistance of counsel claim was inadequately presented due to sufficient reason.
Further, a year has been legislatively determined to be a reasonable time for a pro se non
death penalty litigant to seek post-conviction relief. It follows that even though a year is not per
se reasonable, it is generally a reasonable time to present successive claims after discovering the
reason prior claims were inadequately presented or from the date the basis for a new claim is
discovered. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (I-year period oflimitation for a writ of habeas corpus by a
person in state custody runs from the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence); Hernandez v. State,
133 Idaho 794, 799, 992 P.2d 789, 794 (Ct. App. 1999) (one year is a reasonable time for an
inmate to proceed pro se with a successive post conviction relief action). Time limits generally
begin to run after a prior action becomes final and thus it is generally understood that the time to

1In

a footnote, the state avers that this report was not helpful because it identified the
victim as the source of blood in Mr. Jimenez's pants' pocket and a knife found along the road
near the crime scene in addition to excluding the victim as the source of blood on the shoes.
Respondent's Brief, p. 9 n.4. However, Mr. Jimenez received ineffective assistance of counsel
because trial counsel refused to obtain testing on the shoes despite his request. Mr. Jimenez did
not ask counsel to test the pants and the trial transcript reveals that the state was apparently
unaware there was any blood in the pockets of Mr. Jimenez's pants. The fact that the federal
government elected to analyze the pants' in no way reflects that the state would have if counsel
had performed effectively and secured testing on the shoes. Further, the alleged link between
Mr. Jimenez and the knife was weak, especially in comparison to the considerable weight the
state gave to the blood on the shoes. Thus, while the testing results regarding the pants might
prove problematic for Mr. Jimenez on any re-trial, those results have no bearing on whether the
outcome of the trial would have been different had trial counsel established that the blood on the
shoes was not Mr. Voshall's. See also Appellant's Brief, p. 14-16.
6

file a successive petition would not begin until proceedings with respect to the prior proceedings
were final.
Without any statutory or judicial guidance, successive petitioners are left with no
guidelines to know when they are required bring a successive action. While the reasonableness of
the time frame to bring a successive action is determined on a case by case basis and
reasonableness necessarily includes an analysis of when the petitioner received notice, petitioners
cannot be required to file a successive petition while proceedings on the prior action remain
pending. Because Mr. Jimenez's appeal from the denial of the initial petition remains pending,
his successive petition was necessarily timely and the district court thus erred in concluding that
the successive petition was untimely.
B.

The Case Should be Remanded so That Mr. Jimenez Has the Opportunity to Amend
His Petition in Light of Murphy
Mr. Jimenez reasonably relied on the law as it existed at the time in supporting his

successive petition and, thus, focused on developing his claim that his post-conviction claims
were inadequately presented during initial proceedings due to ineffective assistance of postconviction counsel. Now that the law has changed while the case was pending, justice dictates
that he be allowed to amend his claim that he should be allowed to further explain that he did not
validly waive his post-conviction petition and further explain his sufficient reasons to justify a
successive petition.
In response, the state argues that such a remand would be inconsistent with Murphy v.

State, 156 Idaho 389,327 P.3d 365 (2014) because the petition in that case was not remanded.
However, in Murphy, no other potential sufficient reason was apparent from the record. Here, in
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contrast, Mr. Jimenez alleged that he did not validly waive the claims presented in the successive
petition. Additionally, the existence of the DNA testing confirming that the blood on Mr.
Jimenez's shoes did not belong to the victim presents a potential sufficient reason independent of
the post-conviction counsel's alleged deficiency with respect to that claim.
The state also suggests that a remand allowing amendment in light of Murphy would give
Mr. Jimenez an unfair "third" bite at the opportunity to cure any deficiencies in his petition.
Respondent's Brief, p. 14. However, both parties and the district court all relied on established
precedent in determining whether there was a sufficient reason to file a successive petition.
There is nothing unfair about allowing Mr. Jimenez the opportunity to further support his claim
that he did not waive his post-conviction claims after the Idaho Supreme Court completely
altered the rules.
Mr. Jimenez should be allowed to present facts to support his claim in his pro se
successive petition that he did not waive the claims raised therein during the initial proceedings.
While the absence of any waiver may have a factual nexus with any ineffective assistance by
post-conviction counsel, the inquiry would necessarily focus on what Mr. Jimenez knew rather
than counsel's performance. Mr. Jimenez should also have the opportunity develop other
potential sufficient reasons.

C.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Post-Conviction
Relief Petition Because He Presented Issues of Material Fact Entitling Him to an
Evidentiary Hearing
As explained in Mr. Jimenez's opening brief, the district court erred in summarily

dismissing Mr. Jimenez's post-conviction relief petition because he presented issues of material
fact entitling him to an evidentiary hearing. In response, the state adopted as its "argument on

8

appeal the reasoning set forth in the district court's order of summary dismissal, as well as that
articulated by the state in its Respondent's brief filed in" Mr. Jimenez's prior appeal.
Respondent's Brief, p. 15. In reply, Mr. Jimenez incorporates his reply to the state's brief in
Docket No. 40109. For the convenience of the Court, a copy of the relevant portions of the
Reply Brief filed in Docket No. 40109 is appended to this brief.

III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above and in his opening brief, Mr. Jimenez respectfully asks
this Court to reverse the district court's judgment dismissing his successive post-conviction
claims and to remand this case for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this 15 th day of April, 2014.

y Robyn Fyffe
Attorneys for Juan Anthony Jimenez

9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 15 th day of April, 2014, I caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise,
ID 83720-0010.
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being concluded by judicial relief- i.e. an order remanding the case to the district court with
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DNA testing establishing that the blood on the shoes did not belong to Mr. VoshalL
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Accordingly, the district court's error in refusing DNA testing is not moot and this Court should
consider the claim.

B.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Post-Conviction
Relief Petition Because He Presented Issues of Material Fact Entitling Him to an
Evidentiary Hearing
1.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Claim
That He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Counsel Refused
to Request DNA Testing of the Blood Found on Mr. Jimenez's Shoes

Trial counsel performed deficiently in failing to obtain further testing of the blood on Mr.
Jimenez's shoes, even after Mr. Jimenez explained that the blood came from a fight with a
person named Xavier. Further, such testing would have excluded Mr. Voshall as the source of
that blood and, thus, the State would not have been able to rely on the shoes to support Mr.
Jimenez's alleged guilt. Accordingly, there is a reasonable probability that if the testing had been
done, the outcome of the trial would have been different.
The State's argument in response appears to center around the assumption that trial
counsel would have shared incriminating testing results with the prosecution. See Respondent's
Brief p. 15-16. Thus, the State urges that: "it would have at best been a risky proposition for trial
counsel to have sought DNA testing before trial without knowing for certain what the results of
that testing would be." Respondent's Briefp. 16, n. 5. In light of this "risk" combined with what
it characterizes as the DNA testing's "de minimis exculpatory value," the State claims Mr.
Jimenez did not present an issue of fact sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel
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provided effective assistance.
It is unclear from the State's argument why trial counsel would have made the State privy

to his strategy and investigation or disclosed any testing results that were hann:ful to Mr.
Jimenez. Thus, even if reasonable to assume one's client is being untruthful regarding the facts
of the case in deciding what course of investigation to take, it was not objectively reasonable to
forgo· testing critical evidence because the results might not have been favorable. · Moreover, the
ability to infer the blood on Mr. Jimenez's shoes came from the victim provided the State with a
critical piece of evidence and the value of depriving the State of that evidence can not be
described as de minimis. Thus, Mr. Jimenez was entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to whether
trial counsel's decision to forgo DNA testing was objectively reasonable and whether the results
of the trial would have been different had such testing been accomplished.
a.

there is an issue of fact regarding counsel's deficient performance

Counsel was entitled to access to the blood sample to conduct his own analysis and
investigation. See I.C.R.16(b)(4). Counsel would only have been required to disclose the
specifics and reports of such testing ifhe intended to introduce them in evidence at the trial or to
present testimony related to those results or reports. I. C.R. 16(c)(2). It should go without saying
that competent trial counsel would not have informed the prosecutor of his precise reasoning for
obtaining a sample of the blood or the precise testing obtained. As described by Justice White:
Law enforcement ... must be dedicated to making the criminal trial a procedure
for the ascertainment of the true facts surrounding the commission of the crime...
But defense counsel has no comparable obligation to ascertain or present the truth.
Our system assigns him a different mission .... The State has the obligation to
present the evidence. Defense counsel need present nothing, even ifhe knows
what the truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal any
confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to help the
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prosecution's case.
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 256-57 (1967)(Justice White joined by Justices Harlan and

Stewart, dissenting in part and concurring in part).
It would have been objectively unreasonable for trial counsel to share his reasons for

requesting a sample of the blood on the shoes with the prosecutor1 or to share those results with
the prosecution unless favorable. That Mr. Jimenez obtained a sample of the blood to conduct
his own investigation would not necessarily prompt the State to assume DNA testing would be

In State v. Wood, 132 Idaho 88, 100,967 P.2d 702, 714 (1998), the Court indicated that
the public defender statute did not "guarantee" an ex parte application for investigative assistance
and that the prosecutor knowledge's "of the application" did not deny the defendant due process.
The Court thus held that trial counsel "did not provide ineffective assistance of counsel by
making the requests for assistance in open court with notice to the prosecutor." Here, trial
counsel was privately retained and, thus, would not have sought funding for the DNA testing in
open court.. Whether counsel would have been ineffective in sharing trial strategy with the
prosecution without the necessity of requesting funds is entirely distinct from the circumstance
presented in Wood. In any event, nothing in Wood suggests that an attorney could not request
funding for testing on an ex parte basis when that request would reveal client confidences and
trial strategy. Instead, Wood indicates the statute does not "guarantee" the availability of such a
procedure and counsel was not ineffective iri making the prosecutor aware of the "application" in
that case. Wood should not stand for the proposition that the inability to access funding for
necessary experts on an ex parte basis never violates due process, especially in circumstances in
,. which supporting the request would require counsel to reveal client communications or defense
strategy that would have otherwise remained secret. Principles of fundamental fairness
guaranteed by due process require that the basic tools of an adequate defense be provided to
those defendants who cannot afford to pay for them. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985);
United States v. Chase, 499 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2007). Indigent defendants who must seek
state-funding to hire an expert should not be required to reveal their theory of defense when their
more affluent counterparts, with funds to hire experts, are not required to reveal their theory of
defense. Moore v. State, 889 A.2d 325, 341-42 (Md. 2005). Thus, Congress and several states
provide a mechanism whereby a defendant can submit an ex parte request for investigative
services. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3006A(e) (requiring ex parte hearing when indigent defendant needs
funds); Moore, 889 A.2d at 341 (listing statutes in Minnesota, South Carolina, Te'nnessee,
Nevada and New York that require an ex parte hearing when an indigent defendant requests
funds and indicating that courts in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana,
Michigan, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, and Washington have held that an ex parte hearing is
required).
1
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completed or to change its own decision to limit its testing to confirming that the blood was
human. Moreover, Mr. Jimenez specifically requested that the shoes be tested because he knew
the blood came from someone other than the victim. Requesting testing of the blood found on
the shoes was only a "risky proposition" if counsel assumed Mr. Jimenez was lying and planned
to share his strategy with the prosecution.
The State also suggests that "avoiding testing of the knife may also have played a role in
counsel's tactical choice to not seek testing of the shoes." Respondent's Brief p. 16, n. 5.
However, Mr. Jimenez's explanation of the blood on the shoes would not have prompted trial
counsel to request DNA testing of the knife. Even if testing the shoes resulted in testing the
knife, it was more critical to exclude the victim as the source of blood on the shoes than on the
knife. As described more fully below and in Mr. Jimenez's Opening Brief, the State used the
blood on the shoes to strenuously argue that Mr. Jimenez stabbed the victim even though the
witnesses were only able to testify to a push. While confirmation that the blood on the knife
belonged to the victim certainly would have tied the knife to the offense, it would not have
furthered the State's theory that it was Mr. Jimenez rather than his friend who stabbed the victim.
Mr. Jimenez presented an issue of fact sufficient to rebut the presumption of trial
counsel's effective assistance. Accordingly, he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing and the
district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief.
b.

prejudice

The State not only introduced the shoes into evidence, it repeatedly relied oh the blood to
support Mr. Jimenez's guilt in closing argument. Accordingly, had DNA testing of those shoes
excluded Mr. Voshal1 as the source of the blood, the State would have been deprived of a critical
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piece of its circumstantial evidence puzzle and there is a reasonable probability the outcome of
the trial would have been different.
The State responds that since the DNA evidence would not have conclusively excluded

Mr. Jimenez as the person who stabbed Mr. Voshall, such evidence had minimal exculpatory
value. However, that the testing would not have not completely exonerated Mr. Jimenez does
not render the value of the evidence de minimis, particularly in light of the evidence against Mr.
Jimenez and the role the shoes played in the trial.
After admitting it did not have direct evidence that Mr. Jimenez stabbed Mr. Voshall, the
State argued the jury should find Mr. Jimenez guilty based on the other evidence combined. R
Vol. 2 p. 283 (p. IO, In. 4 - p. 12, In. 18). The State strenuously argued that the blood on Mr.
Jimenez's shoes showed he had stabbed Mr. Voshall, including repeated emphasis on the blood's
position on the shoes and asking the jury to question how else the blood would have gotten there.

Id. 283 (p. 12, 22-25); p. 284 (p. 14, In. 25 - p. 15, In. 10); (p. 15, In. 13-24); p. 285 (p. 17; In. 1725); p. 289 (p. 34, In. 6-10). The State then held the shoes in front of the jury, indicating "the
very shoes that [the criminologist] tested. When you look at these, look for the stains. You'll
notice they're towards the end of the shoes." Id. at p. 290 (p. 40, In. 10-13).
While the State correctly lists other evidence that supported Mr. Jimenez's guilt -the
push, the hand in the pocket and the knife along the road [Respondent's Brief, p. 18] - none of
that evidence directly linked Mr. Jimenez to the stabbing and destroyed his ability to persuasively
argue that it was his companion who wielded the knife in the same manner as the blood on top of
the shoes. Had trial counsel obtained DNA testing, the State would have been deprived of
critical and persuasive evidence of Mr. Jimenez's guilt. Accordingly, there is a reasonable
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probability that DNA testing would have changed the outcome of the trial and the district court
erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's petition for post-conviction relief.

2.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Jimenez's Claim
That He Received Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Because Counsel Failed
to Prepare Mr. Jimenez For Cross-Examination and Failed to Provide Him
With an Opportunity to Adequately View the Surveillance Video

Trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to prepare Mr. Jimenez for crossexamination and by failing to ensure that Mr. Jimenez had an adequate opportunity to view the
video surveillance. Mr. Jimenez was prejudiced by .that performance because he was unprepared
for the prosecutor's questions on cross-examination and had difficulty answering questions about
the video. The district court therefore erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's postconviction relief petition.

In response, the State contends that Mr. Jimenez "failed to articulate how trial counsel
was supposed to divine the questions the prosecutor ultimately asked or what counsel could have
done to improve Jimenez's memory of the events of the evening in question." Respondent's
Brief, p. 22. However, Mr. Jimenez alleged that trial counsel "never prepared me to testify, we
did not practice any questioning, and he did not tell me what questions to expect on
cross-examination." R. Vol. 3, p. 366

,r 13 (emphasis added).

That no attorney can predict the

precise questions a prosecutor will ask does not mean that counsel should not have discussed the

u

I
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likely themes and approaches of the prosecutor's cross-examination, recommended methods of
response and otherwise provide Mr. Jimenez with some idea of what to expect. Similarly, by
running through the topics likely to come out during the testimony, Mr. Jimenez would have
necessarily jogged his memory regarding the events and had a better recoIJection when
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questioned by the prosecutor.
The State also notes that Mr. Jimenez did not specifically allege that he asked his attorney
to reserve a conference room in order to better view the video. As described in Mr. Jimenez's
Opening Brief, such a request can be inferred from the record and, in any event, it is counsel's
responsibility to request adequate facilities to allow clients to review the evidence against them.
Denying access to contact visits so attorneys can review audio and video discovery with criminal
defendants would be a deprivation of the effective assistance of counsel.

Mr. Jimenez presented sufficient evidence to present an issue of fact as to whether trial
counsel performed deficiently by failing to prepare him for cross-examination and by failing to
ensure that he had an adequate opportunity to view the video surveillance. Mr. Jimenez was
prejudiced by that performance because he was unprepared for the prosecutor's questions on
cross-examination and unable to answer questions about the video, which made him seem
evasive to thejury. The district court therefore erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Jimenez's
)

post-conviction relief petition.
3.

Other Reasons the District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr.
Jimenez's Post-Conviction Relief Petition Because He Presented Issues of
Material Fact Entitling Him to an Evidentiary Hearing

As to the other basis for reversal set forth in Mr. Jimenez's Opening Brief, he does not
have any additional reply to the arguments presented in the State's Brief.
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